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Abstract—Computer networks and more specifically wireless
communication networks are increasingly becoming susceptible
to more sophisticated and untraceable attacks. Most of the
current Intrusion Detection Systems either focus on just one layer
of observation or use a limited number of metrics without proper
data fusion techniques. However, the true status of a network,
is rarely accurately detectable by examining only one network
layer or metric. Ideally, a synergistic approach would require
knowledge from various layers to be fused and, collectively, an
ultimate decision to be taken. To this aim, the Dempster-Shafer
(D-S) approach is examined as a data fusion algorithm that
combines beliefs of multiple metrics across multiple layers.
This paper describes the methodology of using metrics from
multiple layers of wireless communication networks for detecting
wireless security breaches. The metrics are analysed and com-
pared to historical data and each gives a belief of whether an
attack takes place or not. The beliefs from different metrics are
fused with the D-S technique with the ultimate goal of limiting
false alarms by combining beliefs from various network layers.
The results show that cross-layer techniques and data fusion
perform more efficiently in a variety of situations compared to
conventional methods.
Index Terms—Cross-layer measurements, data fusion,
Dempster-Shafer, wireless attacks, Wi-Fi
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks and more specifically wireless commu-
nication networks are increasingly becoming susceptible to
more sophisticated and untraceable attacks. Network moni-
toring tools, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), have
been developed for the purpose of detecting such attacks. Most
of these tools are not efficient enough because they either focus
on just one layer of observation (i.e. MAC layer) or use a
limited number of metrics without properly combining each
metric.
A simple algorithm that utilises a single metric from one
layer may give positive results for detecting attacks in some
cases. However, this single metric method might lack effi-
ciency in many other cases, where the nature of the selected
metric might conceal the actual attack. As a result, the
performance of a single metric algorithm can be poor with
an unacceptable number of false alarms.
Therefore, a cross-layer approach may offer a collaborative
decision among layers, potentially resulting in higher detection
accuracy rate and lower number of false negative (FN) and
false positive (FP). Hence, utilising a cross-layer approach may
help towards automating the overall process of detecting and
mitigating wireless network attacks.
This paper describes the methodology of using metrics
from multiple layers of wireless communication networks for
detecting wireless security attacks and particularly Man-In-
the-Middle (MitM) attacks at the physical layer. The metrics
are analysed and compared to historical data and each gives
a belief of whether an attack takes place or not. The beliefs
from different metrics are combined with the Dempster-Shafer
(D-S) theory of evidence method with the ultimate goal of
limiting false alarms and improving the overall performance.
D-S theory of evidence method is a mathematical framework
for the representation of uncertainty.
The aim of our methodology requires the system to be of
low cost, scalable and applicable to other wireless technologies
apart from the tested IEEE 802.11 standard. The presented
methodology has been evaluated by having an attacker inject
forged replies to the HTTP queries of a victim while accessing
four different websites. The number of FP and FN results
are counted and compared against techniques that utilise only
single metrics. We compare our collaborative approach against
results by methods using single metrics and combination of
two metrics.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II the related
work on using cross-layer and data fusion techniques is
presented. An explanation of the D-S data fusion algorithm
along with its advantages and disadvantages is given in section
III. The methodology, testbed and the attack scenarios are
presented in section IV. In section V, the results obtained with
the proposed methodology are discussed and compared against
the results of single or limited combination metrics. Finally,
conclusions are given in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The security angle of wireless network has been visited
many times in research. In [1], the authors give a thorough
review of denial-of-service attacks and counter-measures in
802.11 wireless networks.
The authors in [2] try to leverage the dense deployment of
desktop PCs in an enterprise to detect rogue Access Points
(AP), handle malfunctioning APs and monitor the wireless
network performance.
In a similar spirit, the authors in [3] have developed an
infrastructure named MAP (Measure, Analyse, Protect) where
dedicated wireless sniffing monitors are coordinated in order
to merge and analyse packets by dynamically changing the
monitored channel.
In [4], the authors try to tackle the problem of greedy
users increasing their share of bandwidth by modifying their
wireless client’s driver. This tactic of MAC layer greedy
misbehaviour of course comes at the expense of other users.
The authors propose a classification of the different MAC
misbehaviour techniques and try to detect them using MAC
layer metrics.
In [5], the authors describe methods for distinguishing
between root causes of wireless anomalies at the depth of
the physical layer. For the diagnosis of the above situation,
three sources of information are required by MOJO, all of
which belong at the Physical layer: network interference,
signal strength variation and concurrent transmissions.
Following are described some papers related to Data Fusion.
In general, for papers using D-S for data fusion in communi-
cation networks, the reader is referred to [6], [7].
In [8], the problem of discovering anomalies in a large-scale
networks based on the data fusion of heterogeneous monitors
is considered. The authors used the following metrics: UDP
and ICMP packets in/out ratio and TCP-SYN in/TCP-FIN out
ratio. The D-S algorithm detected ICMP attacks but missed
SYN attacks with 2% attack packets. The authors conclude that
the D-S Theory of Evidence performs well on the detection
of attacks that can be sensed by uncorrelated metrics.
The authors in [9] present and evaluate anomaly-based
intrusion detection algorithms for detecting attacks at the
physical layer, by seeking changes in a single metric, the
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). The algorithms evaluated are
divided into two categories: Local algorithms, which are run
locally and independently per monitor and central algorithms,
where the output of each local algorithm per monitor is fused
in a central node.
In [10], the authors follow a cross-layer approach and try
to detect malicious jamming behavior and differentiate it from
genuine network failures. For physical jamming attacks, the
authors use as metrics the large carrier sensing time, the
number of CRC errors and the increased number of retrans-
missions. For virtual jamming attacks, they measure the false
channel reservation and they calculate the duration when the
channel is idle. If the above metrics exceed a given, pre-define
threshold then a cross-layer design is used to differentiate
between network congestion and malicious channel activity.
The proposed mechanisms are only tested in simulation. The
paper is not focusing on threshold estimation and selection
and the metrics are limited to two layers.
In contrast to the described related work, the proposed
methodology in this paper combines metrics from multiple
layers and fuses the information with the D-S technique for
a synergistic approach towards detecting attacks in wireless
networks.
III. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
A. Mathematical Framework
Dempster-Shafer, as a theory of evidence method, is a dis-
cipline of mathematics that combines evidence of information
from multiple and heterogeneous events in order to calculate
the probability of occurrence of another event.
The D-S theory starts by assuming a Universe of Discourse
Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}, also called a Frame of Discernment,
which is a finite set of all possible mutually exclusive propo-
sitions and hypotheses about some problem domain.
With regards to this work, the frame of discernment is
comprised of A = “Attack” and N = “Normal”. Assuming
Θ has two outcomes {A,N}, the total number of subsets of
Θ, defined by the number of hypotheses that it composes, is
2Θ = {A,N, {A|N},∅}
Each proposition (subset) from Θ is assigned a probability,
or a confidence interval within [0, 1], by an observer from
the mass probability function m (known as “basic probability
assignment”):
m : 2Θ → [0, 1] if

m(∅) = 0
m(A) ≥ 0,∀A ⊆ Θ∑
A⊆Θm(A) = 1
The function m(A) is defined as A’s basic probability
number. It describes the measure of belief that is committed
exactly to hypothesis A.
In order to define the confidence interval that is given to a
certain event, two functions must first be defined. These are
the Belief function (Bel) and the Plausibility function (Pl).
The former is a belief measure of a hypothesis A, and it sums
the mass value of all the non-empty subsets of A.
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B) ∀A ⊆ Θ
The doubt function (Dou) is given by
Dou(A) = Bel(¬A) = 1−
∑
B
⋂
A=∅
m(B)
which accounts for all evidence that rule out the given
proposition represented by A.
Similarly, the Pl function takes into account all the evidence
that does not rule out the given proposition. In other words,
it expresses how much we should believe in A if all currently
unknown facts were to support A.
Pl(A) = 1−Dou(A)
Thus, the true belief in hypothesis A will be along the
interval [Bel(A), P l(A)]. However, in practice, the values
of the interval could be identical and therefore the interval
becomes a unique value.
The idea behind the D-S rule of combination is to fuse the
belief from two different observers into one given hypothesis.
TABLE I
EVENT PROBABILITIES ASSIGNED BY m1(HORIZONTAL X) AND
m2(VERTICAL Y). CELLS IN TABLE REPRESENT m1(X)*m2(Y )
m2 / m1 {A}: 0.32 {N}:0.25 {A,N}: 0.43
{A}: 0.35 0.11 0.09 0.15
{N}: 0.1 0.03 0.031 0.04
{A,N}: 0.55 0.18 0.14 0.24
Let m1 and m2 be the basic probability assignments from
observer 1 and 2 respectively.
Their orthogonal sum, m = m1 ⊕m2, is defined as
m(A) =
∑
X
⋂
Y=Am1(X) ∗m2(Y )
1−∑X⋂Y=∅m1(X) ∗m2(Y ) when A 6= ∅
(1)
If the denominator of eq. (1) is equal to zero, K = 0, then
m1⊕m2 does not exist and m1 and m2 are said to be totally
or flatly contradictory.
To easily understand how to apply the D-S algorithm,
a real example from our measurements is presented. The
basic probabilities for an event being “Attack”, “Normal”, and
“Uncertain”, can be tabulated as seen in Table I.
Firstly K is calculated from eq. (1): K = 1−(0.03+0.09) =
0.88. As described in eq (1), for any event E the combined
belief is given by:
m(E) = 1/K ∗
∑
X
⋂
Y=E
m1(X) ∗m2(Y )
Therefore,
m(A) = 1.14 ∗ (0.11 + 0.15 + 0.18) = 0.5
m(N) = 1.14 ∗ (0.031 + 0.14 + 0.04) = 0.23
m(A|N) = 1.14 ∗ (0.28) = 0.27
According to the results, the hypothesis more likely to be
true is A, with higher belief than the other hypotheses.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages
Among the different methods (Bayesian, Principal Compo-
nent Analysis), the D-S theory of evidence was chosen as one
data fusion method because it has uncertainty management
and inference mechanisms analogous to our human reasoning
process [11]. This means, D-S is able to combine evidence
from multiple and heterogeneous sources.
In addition, it is suitable for detecting previously unseen
attacks because it does not require a priori knowledge. In
contrast, Bayesian inference requires a priori knowledge and
does not allow allocation of probability to ignorance but only
to an event being normal or abnormal [7].
It is also important to note that D-S can deal with the
uncertainty of an event by assigning a value for ignorance
which allows us to tackle a large range of problems.
Nevertheless, there are two drawbacks associated with the
D-S algorithm. Firstly, the computation complexity and sec-
ondly the conflicting beliefs management.
The computational complexity increases exponentially with
the number of possible event outcomes (Θ). If there are n
elements in Θ, there will be up to 2n − 1 focal elements
(ignoring ∅) for the mass functions. The combination of two
mass functions needs the computation of up to 2n intersections
[7].
The frame of discernment in the proposed methodology in-
cludes two elements, normal and abnormal, and therefore there
will be three focal elements of belief functions, {Normal},
{Attack} and {Uncertainty}. Thus, the computational com-
plexity of the algorithm is low [7].
The conflicting belief phenomenon is nicely illustrated with
an example from [7]. Given three events, {A,B,C} and two
sensors, Sensor 1 might assign m(A) = 0.9, m(B) = 0.1
and m(C) = 0 as beliefs in A, B and C respectively.
Similarly, Sensor 2 might assign m(A) = 0, m(B) = 0.1
and m(C) = 0.9 as beliefs in A, B and C. Applying the
D-S algorithm on these values, the rule of combination will
result with a higher belief in event B, which is clearly wrong.
In the proposed detection algorithm of this work, each event
is assigned a non-zero mass function and therefore the belief
conflict phenomenon is not an issue.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. MitM attack at Physical Layer
The most common and straight forward method for an
attacker to perform a MitM attack is to do first MAC spoofing,
usually by performing an ARP poisoning attack (i.e. the
attacker sends messages indicating that he owns a specific
MAC address). This is a well known MAC layer attack.
However, for the purposes of this work, a MitM attack at the
physical layer as implemented by the Airpwn tool [12] was
examined.
Airpwn takes advantage of the duration of time that a server
requires to respond to web-page requests. In that lag time, it
can inject its own content onto the wireless channel of an
access point. For example, a client may request a page from
wikipedia.org that takes, round-trip, approximately 13 ms. If
an attacker near the victim is running the airpwn tool, it will
see the legal client’s request and immediately responds with
its own HTML code. Due to the fact that there are no hops
between the attacker and the victim, it takes the attacker much
less time to respond. When the client receives the data, it
will assume the original request was answered and process
the injected code. Even though the attack is launched at the
application layer by injecting an HTTP packet, the actual
attack is practical only because there are no mechanisms in
WiFi 802.11 to prevent a misbehaving node from injecting
their own malicious code in the form of valid 802.11 frames.
When the real and authentic HTTP packet arrives, the
content will either be ignored, if the packet size is smaller
than the injected packet, or partially displayed, if the size is
larger than the injected.
Using scripts, Airpwn injects carefully crafted response
code that could cause harm of varying severity. Less dangerous
effects to the victim could include replacing the adverts of a
specific web site with different ones; more dangerous activity
could include redirecting the victim web browser to a phishing
type of web site.
In our experiments, two types of attacks were launched
against the client. Both attack codes were default options in
the Airpwn suite. We refer to these attacks as Attack 01 and
Attack 02. In the first type of attack, the attacker eavesdrops
the HTTP request frame from a client destined to a web server
and then proceeds by injecting a forged frame. In this type of
attack the forged frame contains HTML code that replaces the
title of the authentic web page to a custom one as seen in Fig.
1. In the second type of attack, the attacker listens for requests
for images hosted on the web site and injects its own images
(Fig. 2). In addition, the attacker injects TCP reset frames so
the client proceeds requesting the remaining objects of the web
site.
As this type of MitM attack takes place at the physical
layer, it cannot be detected with conventional MAC spoofing
detection techniques. For example, one way to detect MAC
spoofing is by sending an ICMP packet to the victim IP which
would result in two addresses replying (the victim and the
attacker).
Fig. 1. A chinese site as presented to victim with attack 01. Notice the
“Hello Defcon! ... ” message.
Fig. 2. A chinese site as presented to victim with attack 02. Notice the
“AIRPWNED” image.
B. Metrics and Testbed
The next task was to examine the actual manifestations of
the Airpwn tool across different layers. Several metrics are
identified that if appropriately used could give evidence of
a MitM attack at the physical layer. These metrics are: The
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI), the transmission
rate (or injection rate), and the Time To Live value (TTL).
The TTL value is a metric of the IP layer, the transmission
rate belongs to the MAC layer and finally the RSSI is related
to the Physical layer.
The testbed where the experiments took place can be seen in
Fig. 3. It includes a client associated with an AP and accesses
webpages hosted on the Internet across different geographical
locations. The attack scenario consists of an attacker that
launches the attack using the Airpwn tool and a third party
node in passive monitoring mode that captures packets from
this particular wireless network. The monitoring node and the
attacker were running the BackTrack Linux operating system
and all the devices except from the AP used Atheros chipset
in their wireless cards. The AP is a Cisco Linksys model
WRT54GL.
It should be noted that the attacker was placed very close
to the AP, around 1.5 meters apart. This positioning of the
equipment made the detection of attacks much more difficult
as the RSSI values of the attacker could become identical to
these of the AP. The RSSI is a volatile value that depends
on many factors such as distance, physical obstacles, WLAN
equipment, used frequency and an environmental coefficient
[13]. As a result, just by examining the RSSI values it could
be difficult to differentiate between attacker and AP.
In addition, Airpwn does not dynamically adapt the TTL
field of the injected frames but predefines it to a static random
value. The Airpwn source code has a default TTL value of
255. As this value is quite unrealistic and could easily reveal
which frames are malicious, the code was modified in order to
change the TTL value to 64. This value was chosen because
it is the default TTL value for Linux web servers and the
injected frame could be misidentified as a frame of the local
area network.
The proposed methodology can be seen as a flow chart
in Fig. 4. By using a wireless monitoring node the packets
transmitted are collected from both the authentic AP and
the forged attacker. From the information within the packets,
historical data are constructed for a specific time window.
More specifically, the statistical mode of RSSI and TTL are
calculated for the current window. The metrics RSSI and TTL
from every received packet are compared against the mode of
the current time period. The beliefs for “Attack” for each of
the selected metrics are chosen experimentally and intuitively
i.e. the bigger the difference from the mode, the higher the
belief in the attack.
Regarding the injection rate, a different approach was
followed. Given that most attacking tools that inject forged
packets are more efficient at low injection rates, a higher belief
in attack was assigned for packets transmitted with a low rate
and a lower belief in attack for packets transmitted with high
rate.
Monitor
BackTrack 4
Atheros Card
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BackTrack 4
Atheros Card
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Access Point
AP
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Fig. 3. Testbed and steps of attack for Airpwn
Capture Packets
Get metrics: RSSI, TTL, 
transmission rate
Construct statistics (mode)
Fuse beliefs for each metric 
with Dempster-Shafer
Assign belief in attack 
for each metric
Fig. 4. Methodology Flowchart
V. PRACTICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section the results from the proposed cross-layer
methodology are presented and compared against single layer
metrics and against the cross-layer technique using just two
metrics. The experiments were run while a client was access-
ing websites located in China, Spain, UK and US.
The cross-layer results are presented in Table II and are the
best results overall and for each individual experiment except
for some FN results that occur while launching the second
type of Airpwn attack when the client visits the Chinese and
UK websites. These FN results occur because the RSSI and
the TTL values of the attack packets coincide with the values
of the estimated mode. This could happen because consecutive
injected forged packets alter the actual value of the mode. As a
result, both RSSI and TTL values of several attack packets are
close to the mode, leaving the decision of whether an attack
is happening or not just on the injection rate. However, the
belief of an attack happening just by examining the injection
rate is not high enough to raise an alarm. There is a trade-off
between the number of FN and FP results of the algorithm
and, therefore, increasing the belief in “Attack” for injection
rate could reduce FN but would also increase FP.
The results for the single layer metrics RSSI and TTL are
presented in Tables III and IV respectively. The RSSI has a
high number of false alarms in most of the experiments. In
particular, using just the RSSI metic the FN results are so
high rendering this metric unacceptable for this purpose.
In the case of single metric TTL (Table IV), the FN results
are much less than the FN results of the RSSI metric and the
performance in terms of FN is similar to the one achieved by
the cross layer technique. However, there is a big increase in
the FP results in most of the scenarios.
The combination of RSSI and injection rate metrics (Table
V), quite surprisingly, results in bad performance in most cases
with an extremely high FN percentage reaching even 100% in
one case. This is a clear example showcasing that two metrics
alone might not necessarily yield an improved performance
and a more expanded synergistic approach from more metrics
is necessary.
In the case of the combination of injection rate and TTL
(Table VI), the performance is better in comparison to all
single metrics. However, given the overall high number of FP,
especially for “US attack”, its performance does not reach that
level gained from the cross-layer results neither the one of the
combination of RSSI and injection rate.
TABLE II
CROSS LAYER RESULTS UTILISING RSSI, INJECTION RATE AND TTL
Website Type False Pos. (%) False Neg. (%)
China Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 15
Spain Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 0
UK Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 8.33 18.52
US Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 0
TABLE III
SINGLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING RSSI
Website Type False Pos. (%) False Neg. (%)
China Normal 7.14 0
Attack 1.31 20
Attack 2 2.9 90
Spain Normal 5 0
Attack 1.56 0
Attack 2 0 87.5
UK Normal 0.97 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 14.5 94.45
US Normal 17.64 0
Attack 46.87 0
Attack 2 0 94.11
TABLE IV
SINGLE METRIC RESULTS UTILISING TIME-TO-LIVE
Website Type False Pos. (%) False Neg. (%)
China Normal 22.45 0
Attack 21.05 0
Attack 2 16.67 15
Spain Normal 0 0
Attack 53.12 0
Attack 2 0 0
UK Normal 1.95 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 10.8 18.52
US Normal 4.9 0
Attack 6.25 0
Attack 2 11.29 0
TABLE V
DUAL METRIC RESULTS UTILISING RSSI AND INJECTION RATE
Website Type False Pos. (%) False Neg. (%)
China Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 80
Spain Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 25
UK Normal 2.82 0
Attack 3.03 100
Attack 2 5.56 64.96
US Normal 0 0
Attack 18.75 0
Attack 2 1.12 88.23
TABLE VI
DUAL METRIC RESULTS UTILISING TIME-TO-LIVE AND INJECTION RATE
Website Type False Pos. (%) False Neg. (%)
China Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 0
Spain Normal 0 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 0 0
UK Normal 19.74 0
Attack 0 0
Attack 2 13.58 0
US Normal 0.98 0
Attack 43.75 0
Attack 2 1.13 0
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper argues that the conventional approach of using
single metrics for detecting attacks in wireless networks is
sometimes inefficient, inaccurate and misleading. Similarly,
techniques involving multiple metrics without utilising a
proper data fusion technique lack efficiency. To this aim, the
authors propose a new approach for detecting wireless network
attacks, involving combining beliefs from sensors of multiple
layers of observation and their belief is combined to produce
a collective decision on whether an attack takes place or not.
The beliefs from different metrics are combined with the
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence method with the ulti-
mate goal of limiting false alarms and improving the overall
performance. For combining beliefs among multiple metrics
from various layers, our work examined and implemented
the D-S theory of evidence method, which is a mathematical
framework for the representation of uncertainty.
In this paper the authors have demonstrated with experi-
ments on a real wireless network that combining beliefs from
multiple metrics in various layers outperforms the efficiency
and accuracy of single metrics. The cross-layer results are the
best results overall and for each individual experiment except
for some FN results present in two cases (UK and China in
“Attack 2” scenario). These FN results are produced because
consequtive injected forged frames alter the perception of
characteristics for “normal” traffic of the algorithm. Clearly,
this is a conceptual issue inherent in window based algorithms.
As for future work, an important issue to consider is how to
automate the assignment of beliefs and the adaptive selection
of appropriate metrics using data mining techniques.
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